US vs. SHAHRAZAD MIR GHOLIKHAN

Between June 24, 2002, and May 13, 2004, Hamid Reza KARGAR, an Iranian national
living in Tehran and doing business as TEHRAN NARA COMPANY, contacted a confidential
source working for the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (DHS/ICE) and stated that he wished to purchase approximately 3,500 units of
night vision, generation III goggles. KARGAR stated that the night vision goggles would be
shipped to Iran via Dubai, United Arab Emirates and that he did not have a certified end user’s
certificate due to the embargo in Iran. ........

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Rethinking the Strait of Hormuz: A Recommended Course of Action that Establishes Operational Advantage

The recent proliferation of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)weapons has changed the severity of the threat in constricted waters such as the Strait ofHormuz (SOH) and the Arabian Gulf. This paper illustrates how Iran has combined thesemodern weapons with a hybrid form of warfare that presents a Coalition Naval Force (CNF)with a serious threat when operating in Iran’s littoral waters. The US Navy and its coalitionpartners must assess the nature of Iran’s A2/AD network when considering which Course ofAction (COA) will allow them to fight, win and survive a conflict with Iran. This paperrecommends a COA that will allow a CNF to achieve desired objectives by leveraging theoperational advantages of operating in the blue water environment of the North Arabian Sea. This recommendation is defended by refuting the prevailing school of thought whichcontends that freedom of navigation can and must be maintained through the SOH. It dispelsthe myths and misperceptions regarding Iran’s inability to control the straits and our ability tofight our way in/out of the Arabian Gulf. Finally, by drawing on examples from pastoperations, the paper supports the argument that a CNF’s conventional advantages will allowthem to achieve the desired objectives while limiting the scale of the conflict.

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